Building BitTyrant, a (More) strategic BitTorrent client

• Autores: Michael Piatek, Tomas Isdal, Tom Anderson, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Arun Venkataramani
• Localización: ;login:: the magazine of USENIX & SAGE, ISSN 1044-6397, Vol. 32, Nº. 4 (AGO), 2007, págs. 8-13
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Peer-to.peer systems often appeal to scalability as a motivating feature. As more users request data, more users contribute results. Scaling a service by relying on user contributions -the P2P approach- depends on providing incentives for users to make those contributions. Recently, the popular BitTorrent file distribution tool has emerged as the canonical example of an incentive-aware P2P design. Although BitTorrent has been in widespread use for years and has been studied extensively, we find that its incentive strategy is not foolproof. This article describes BitTyrant, a new, strategic BitTorrent client. For users interested in faster downloads, BitTyrant provides a media 70% performance improvement on live Internet swarms. However, BitTyrant also demostrates that selfish users can improve performance even while reducing uploadcontribution, circumventing intended incentives.