The naive topology of the conscious subject

• Autores: Rory Madden
• Localización: Noûs, ISSN-e 1468-0068, Vol. 49, Nº. 1, 2015, págs. 55-70
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • What does our naïve conception of a conscious subject demand of the nature of conscious beings? In a series of recent papers David Barnett has argued that a range of powerful intuitions in the philosophy of mind are best explained by the hypothesis that our naïve conception imposes a requirement of mereological simplicity on the nature of conscious beings. It is argued here that there is a much more plausible explanation of the intuitions in question. Our naïve conception of a conscious subject imposes a requirement of topological integrity.