Electoral manipulation as bureaucratic control

• Autores: Scott Gehlbach, Alberto Simpser
• Localización: American Journal of Political Science, ISSN-e 1540-5907, Vol. 59, Nº. 1, 2015, págs. 212-224
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Bureaucratic compliance is often crucial for political survival, yet eliciting that compliance in weakly institutionalized environments requires that political principals convince agents that their hold on power is secure. We provide a formal model to show that electoral manipulation can help to solve this agency problem. By influencing beliefs about a ruler's hold on power, manipulation can encourage a bureaucrat to work on behalf of the ruler when he would not otherwise do so. This result holds under various common technologies of electoral manipulation. Manipulation is more likely when the bureaucrat is dependent on the ruler for his career and when the probability is high that even generally unsupportive citizens would reward bureaucratic effort. The relationship between the ruler's expected popularity and the likelihood of manipulation, in turn, depends on the technology of manipulation.