Logical relations between Necessity and Possibility: evidence from Old and Middle English

• Autores: Lucía Loureiro Porto
• Localización: Proceedings from the 31st AEDEAN Conference: [electronic resource] / María Jesús Lorenzo Modia (ed. lit.), José Miguel Alonso Giráldez (ed. lit.), Mónica Amenedo Costa (ed. lit.), María J. Cabarcos-Traseira (ed. lit.), Begoña Lasa Álvarez (ed. lit.), 2008, ISBN 978-84-9749-278-2, págs. 279-289
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The definition and classification of modality has been paid much attention in the literature (Lyons 1977, Palmer 1986, Coates 1983, Sweetser 1990, Bybee et al. 1994, etc.) and, although scholars do not agree as for a single classification, they do coincide in the recognition of necessity and possibility as the two basic modal meanings. It is the relation between these meanings that constitutes the main concern in this study. From Lyons (1977) onwards, the logical relations between necessity and possibility have been taken for granted: "if X is not possible, not-X is necessary, and if X is not necessary, not-X is possible". These relations establish that one of the meanings may develop from the other. While Van der Auwera and Plungian (1998) claim that such a development may be bidirectional, i.e. necessity may stem from possibility and possibility may stem from necessity, Traugott and Dasher (2002) claim that only necessity can stem from possibility. In this scenario, this paper aims at 1) finding empirical evidence for the logical relations between necessity and possibility, and 2) confirming whether the development of these meanings is bidirectional or not. The empirical support consists of the analysis of German modal verb dürfen (as found in Van der Auwera and Plungian, 1998) and English tharf (