Chemical atomism: : a case study in confirmation and ontology

• Autores: Joshua D. K. Brown
• Localización: Synthese, ISSN-e 1573-0964, Vol. 192, Nº. 2, 2015, págs. 453-485
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Quine, taking the molecular constitution of matter as a paradigmatic example, offers an account of the relation between theory confirmation and ontology. Elsewhere, he deploys a similar ontological methodology to argue for the existence of mathematical objects. Penelope Maddy considers the atomic/molecular theory in more historical detail. She argues that the actual ontological practices of science display a positivistic demand for �direct observation,� and that fulfillment of this demand allows us to distinguish molecules and other physical objects from mathematical abstracta. However, the confirmation of the atomic/molecular theory and the development of scientists� ontological attitudes towards atoms was more complicated and subtle than even Maddy supposes. The present paper argues that the history of the theory in fact supports neither Quine�s and Maddy�s accounts of scientific ontology. There was no general demand from scientists to �see� atoms before they were reckoned to be real; but neither did the indispensable appearance of atoms in the best theory of chemical combination suffice to convince scientists of their reality.