Judging language plain

• Autores: Lawrence Solan
• Localización: Ens queda la paraula: estudis de lingüística aplicada en honor a M. Teresa Turell / Raquel Casesnoves-Ferrer (ed. lit.), Montse Forcadell (ed. lit.), Núria Gavaldà Ferré (ed. lit.), 2014, ISBN 978-84-9984-149-6, págs. 279-296
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • The question raised in this essay is the extent to which we can govern ourselves by relying on the plain meaning of authoritative texts. The meaning of language is not always plain, so the answer cannot possibly be that we can always govern ourselves by relying on plain meaning. But that does not tell us very much. What we really should ask is whether language can be made plain often enough so that it becomes attractive to incorporate plain language rules into a system of statutory interpretation, perhaps even as its centrepiece. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia puts the primacy of the text in these terms: "When the text of a statute is clear, that is the end of the matter." (Scalia, 1997: 16). ScaLia and Brian Garner, in their book on statutory interpretation, note however: "The doctrine is essentially sound but largely unhelpful, since determining what is unambiguous is eminently debatable." (Scalia & Garner, 2012: 436).

    This leaves two important questions: What does it mean for language to be plain, and when the language is plain, should the legal system always defer to it? These questions are the subject of this essay.