The ESMA Doctrine: a Constitutional Revolution and the Economics of Delegation

• Autores: Dariusz Adamski
• Localización: European law review, ISSN 0307-5400, Nº 6, 2014, págs. 812-834
• Idioma: inglés
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• Dialnet Métricas: 1 Cita
• Resumen

  • The judgment of the Court of Justice in the so-called ESMA case (C-270/12) has rejuvenated the debate on the agencification process in the European Union. This article contributes to this debate, arguing that, in the ESMA case, the Court developed a new constitutional doctrine. It contends that this doctrine is much more flexible than the previously dominant thinking about the constitutional boundaries of the delegation in the European Union. Furthermore, this contribution introduces the concept of the economics of delegation, arguing that the ESMA doctrine is well-positioned to maximise benefits of delegation. It also highlights, though, that the ESMA doctrine does not pay enough attention to the two constitutional requirements of independence and accountability which determine the costs of delegation.