Explaining extremity in the foreign policies of parliamentary democracies

• Autores: Ryan K. Beasley, Juliet Kaarbo
• Localización: International Studies Quarterly, ISSN-e 1468-2478, Vol. 58, Nº. 4, 2014, págs. 729-740
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Why do multiparty cabinets in parliamentary democracies produce more extreme foreign policies than single-party cabinets? Our paper argues that particular institutional and psychological dynamics explain this difference. We test this argument using a global events data set incorporating foreign policy behaviors of numerous multiparty and single-party governments. We find that more parties and weak parliaments promote extremity in coalitions, but parliamentary strength has the opposite effect for single-party governments. This study challenges existing expectations about the impact of democratic institutions on foreign policy.