Pictorial experience and intentionalism

• Autores: Alon Chasid
• Localización: Journal of aesthetics & art criticism, ISSN-e 1540-6245, ISSN 0021-8529, Vol. 72, Nº 5, 2014, págs. 405-416
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • This article examines the compatibility of intentionalism (also called �representationalism�) in the philosophy of perception with the thesis that we can visually experience an object by looking at a picture of that object (the pictorial experience thesis, or PET). I begin by presenting three theses associated with intentionalism and various accounts of depiction that uphold PET. Next, I show that pictures sometimes depict an object indeterminately, thereby rendering the alleged visual experience of the depicted object partly nonintentional. I then argue that if PET is true, explaining pictorial indeterminacy on intentionalist premises is problematic. I conclude that PET is incompatible with intentionalism.