The �Now What� Problem for error theory

• Autores: Matt Lutz
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 171, Nº. 2, 2014, págs. 351-371
• Idioma: alemán
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • Error theorists hold that, although our first-order moral thought and discourse commits us to the existence of moral truths, there are no such truths. Holding this position in metaethics puts the error theorist in an uncomfortable position regarding first-order morality. When it comes to our pre-theoretic moral commitments, what should the error theorist think? What should she say? What should she do? I call this the �Now What� Problem for error theory. This paper suggests a framework for evaluating different approaches to the �Now What� Problem, and goes on to evaluate the three most common responses to this problem. All three are found to have noteworthy problems. Finally, I present my own solution, and argue that it presents the most appealing solution to the �Now What� Problem.