In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity

• Autores: Christopher Cowie
• Localización: Synthese, ISSN-e 1573-0964, Vol. 191, Nº. 16, 2014, págs. 4003-4017
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • According to epistemic instrumentalists the normativity of evidence for belief is best explained in terms of the practical utility of forming evidentially supported beliefs. Traditional arguments for instrumentalism�arguments based on naturalism and motivation�lack suasive force against opponents. A new argument for the view�the Argument from Coincidence�is presented. The argument shows that only instrumentalists can avoid positing an embarrassing coincidence between the practical value of believing in accordance with one�s evidence, and the existence of reasons so to believe. Responses are considered and shown to be inadequate.