Pricing competition and channel coordination in the tourism supply chain with optional tours

• Qiang Guo ^[1] ; Ye Shi ^[2] ; Junfeng Dong ^[2] ; Xiaolong Guo ^[2] ; Chris K. Anderson ^[3]
  1. [1] Hainan University

     Hainan University

     China

     
  2. [2] University of Science and Technology of China

     University of Science and Technology of China

     China

     
  3. [3] Cornell University

     Cornell University

     City of Ithaca, Estados Unidos

     

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• Localización: Tourism economics: the business and finance of tourism and recreation, ISSN 1354-8166, Vol. 20, Nº. 5, 2014, págs. 939-960
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • The authors consider a tourism supply chain that consists of a tour operator in the source market and a local operator at the destination. The tour product is composed of predesigned tours and optional tours. Consumers are sensitive to the price and the availability of optional tours, represented as the ratio of optional tours. The authors analyse how the ratio of optional tours to predesigned tours affects each player's equilibrium decisions given three different consumer attitudes towards optional tours. They find that when the channel is coordinated and the ratio of optional tours is sufficiently large, the local operator may reduce commissions. To curb the impacts of lowering commissions, the authors introduce a tax mechanism aimed at optional tours. Numeral examples are provided to illustrate the pricing impacts of optional tours.