An oligopoly model for analyzing and evaluating (Re)-Assignments of spectrum licenses

• Autores: Simon Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx
• Localización: Review of Industrial Organization, ISSN-e 1573-7160, Vol. 45, Nº. 3, 2014, págs. 245-273
• Idioma: alemán
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • The Communications Act requires the Federal Communications Commission to assess whether proposed spectrum license transactions serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity. We review the FCC�s implementation of this component of the Act. We provide a tractable economic model of competition among wireless service providers in which spectrum licenses are a cost-reducing input. This model allows us to evaluate the effects of (re-)assigning spectrum licenses on economic outcomes and to define operational measures of �warehousing� licenses. Calibrating the model, we find little evidence of warehousing and that the approved Verizon-T-Mobile-SpectrumCo transaction increased social surplus.