Exclusion, still not tracted

• Autores: Douglas Keaton, Thomas W. Polger
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 171, Nº. 1, 2014, págs. 135-148
• Idioma: alemán
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• Resumen

  • Karen Bennett has recently articulated and defended a �compatibilist� solution to the causal exclusion problem. Bennett�s solution works by rejecting the exclusion principle on the grounds that even though physical realizers are distinct from the mental states or properties that they realize, they necessarily co-occur such that they fail to satisfy standard accounts of causal over-determination. This is the case, Bennett argues, because the causal background conditions for core realizers being sufficient causes of their effects are identical to the �surround� conditions with which the core realizers are metaphysically sufficient the states or properties that they realize. Here we demonstrate that the background conditions for the causal sufficiency of core realizers for their effects are not identical to the core realizer�s surrounds, nor do backgrounds necessitate such surround conditions. If compatibilist solutions to exclusion can be defended, a different argument will be needed.