Varieties of externalism

• Autores: J. Adam Carter, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos, Duncan Pritchard
• Localización: Philosophical Issues, ISSN-e 1758-2237, Vol. 24, Nº. 1, 2014, págs. 63-109
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Our aim is to provide a topography of the relevant philosophical terrain with regard to the possible ways in which knowledge can be conceived of as extended. We begin by charting the different types of internalist and externalist proposals within epistemology, and we critically examine the different formulations of the epistemic internalism/externalism debate they lead to. Next, we turn to the internalism/externalism distinction within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In light of the above dividing lines, we then examine first the extent to which content externalism is compatible with epistemic externalism; second, whether active externalism entails epistemic externalism; and third whether there are varieties of epistemic externalism that are better suited to accommodate active externalism. Finally, we examine whether the combination of epistemic and cognitive externalism is necessary for epistemology and we comment on the potential ramifications of this move for social epistemology and philosophy of science.