Anthropocentrism and speciesism: conceptual and normative issues

• Autores: Cátia Faria, Eze Paez
• Localización: Revista de bioética y derecho: publicación del Máster en bioética y derecho, ISSN-e 1886-5887, Nº. 32, 2014, págs. 82-90
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Anthropocentrism is the position according to which the interests of human beings should be favoured over the interests of nonhuman entities. Anthropocentrism is usually associated with speciesism, a slightly different position that defends the preferential consideration and treatment of certain individuals based on their species membership. In this article, we will challenge two common assumptions regarding the relation between anthropocentrism and speciesism. The first assumption is that anthropocentrism and speciesism are equivalent concepts. However, there are clear counterexamples of non-anthropocentric speciesism, that is, cases in which there is a preferential consideration of members of a certain nonhuman species over the members of other nonhuman species. The second assumption is the inevitability of anthropocentrism, which would supposedly justify speciesism. Nevertheless, this justificatory attempt is based on a fatal ambiguity between epistemic and moral anthropocentrism. Once this ambiguity is dissolved we will show how moral anthropocentrism does not follow from epistemic anthropocentrism and that any attempt to justify speciesism from epistemic anthropocentrism is deeply unwarranted. Finally, we will conclude that both anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric forms of speciesism are unjustified.