Is there a dilemma for the truthmaker non-maximalist?

• Autores: Alexander Skiles
• Localización: Synthese, ISSN-e 1573-0964, Vol. 191, Nº. 15, 2014, págs. 3949-3959
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Mark Jago has presented a dilemma for truthmaker non-maximalism--the thesis that some but not all truths require truthmakers. The dilemma arises because some truths that do not require truthmakers by the non-maximalist's lights (e.g., that Santa Claus does not exist) are necessitated by truths that do (e.g., that Barack Obama knows that Santa Claus does not exist). According to Jago, the non-maximalist can supply a truthmaker for such a truth only by conceding the primary motivation for the view: that it allows one to avoid positing strange 'negative' entities without adopting a non-standard account of the necessary features of ordinary things. In this paper, I sketch out and defend two plausible non-maximalist proposals that evade Jago's dilemma.