The holistic presumptions of the indispensability argument

• Autores: Russell Marcus
• Localización: Synthese, ISSN-e 1573-0964, Vol. 191, Nº. 15, 2014, págs. 3575-3594
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • The indispensability argument is sometimes seen as weakened by its reliance on a controversial premise of confirmation holism. Recently, some philosophers working on the indispensability argument have developed versions of the argument which, they claim, do not rely on holism. Some of these writers even claim to have strengthened the argument by eliminating the controversial premise. I argue that the apparent removal of holism leaves a lacuna in the argument. Without the holistic premise, or some other premise which facilitates the transfer of evidence to mathematical portions of scientific theories, the argument is implausible