Crowdsourcing with all-pay auctions: : a field experiment on taskcn

• Autores: Tracy Xiao Liu, Jiang Yang, Lada A. Adamic, Yan Chen
• Localización: Management science: journal of the Institute for operations research and the management sciences, ISSN 0025-1909, Vol. 60, Nº. 8, 2014, págs. 2020-2037
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • To explore the effects of different incentives on crowdsourcing participation and submission quality, we conduct a randomized field experiment on Taskcn, a large Chinese crowdsourcing site using mechanisms with features of an all-pay auction. In our study, we systematically vary the size of the reward as well as the presence of a soft reserve, or early high-quality submission. We find that a higher reward induces significantly more submissions and submissions of higher quality. In comparison, we find that high-quality users are significantly less likely to enter tasks where a high-quality solution has already been submitted, resulting in lower overall quality in subsequent submissions in such soft reserve treatments.