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Conflicts and strategies in administrative law

  • Autores: Giulio Napolitano
  • Localización: International journal of constitutional law, ISSN 1474-2640, Vol. 12, Nº. 2, 2014, págs. 357-369
  • Idioma: inglés
  • Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
  • Resumen
    • Administrative law solves conflicts; but, at the same time, it is a battlefield. Principles and values do exist, and judicial review plays an important role in crafting and enforcing them. Nonetheless, a significant part of administrative law is in the hands of multiple political, institutional, and economic actors, who struggle, interact, and bargain. Each of them acts as a rational agent, trying to maximize its welfare through the manipulation of administrative law. Outcomes of this multipolar struggle and, subsequently, rules of administrative law differ from one legal order to another. But the logics are common to different administrative law systems around the world. And some preliminary hypothesis about most successful strategies-like the power to rule, coalition capacity, costs allocation-can be generalized or tested in different contexts. Conflicts in administrative law, of course, are not a single-battle war. Every move of one actor responds to the moves of others. This is why administrative law is a repeated interactions game. Each move is incremental and path-dependent. Legal devices and mechanisms set up in the previous round cannot be easily and fully dismantled. As a consequence, understanding administrative law in complex legal orders and societies requires a microanalysis approach: "Devil is in the details."


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