Communication in federal politics: : universalism, policy uniformity, and the optimal allocation of fiscal authority

• Autores: Anke S. Kessler
• Localización: Journal of Political Economy, ISSN-e 1537-534X, Vol. 122, Nº. 4, 2014, págs. 766-805
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The paper presents a positive model of policy formation in federal legislatures when delegates engage in the strategic exchange of policy-relevant information. Depending on the type of policy under consideration, communication between delegates generally suffers from a bias that makes truthful communication difficult and sometimes impossible. This generates inefficient federal policy choices that are often endogenously characterized by overspending, universalism, and uniformity. Building on these findings, I develop a theory of fiscal (de-)centralization, which revisits the work of Oates in a world of incomplete information and strategic communication. Empirical results from a cross section of US municipalities are consistent with the predicted pattern of spending.