Modal humeanism and arguments from possibility

• Autores: Margot Strohminger
• Localización: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, ISSN-e 1467-9264, Vol. 113, Nº. 3, 2013, págs. 391-401
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • Sider (2011, 2013) proposes a reductive analysis of metaphysical modality��(modal) Humeanism��and goes on to argue that it has interesting epistemological and methodological implications. In particular, Humeanism is supposed to undermine a class of �arguments from possibility�, which includes Sider's (1993) own argument against mereological nihilism and Chalmers's (1996) argument against physicalism. I argue that Sider's arguments do not go through, and moreover that we should instead expect Humeanism to be compatible with the practice of arguing from possibility in philosophy.