Multilateral institutions for international economic policy coordination: bargaining vs voting.

• Autores: Antonio J. Morales Siles, A. Jorge Padilla
• Localización: Spanish economic review, ISSN 1435-5469, Vol. 1, Nº 3, 1999, págs. 263-282
• Idioma: alemán
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• Resumen

  • Abstract. We study a world economy where worldwide policy coordination is essential to optimally stabilize unfavorable common supply shocks. We develop a two-stage game to investigate how to implement the first-best response to these shocks via a multilateral institution, whose board of directors is composed of a representative per each member country. In a first stage, national governments nominate their representatives on the board. In a second stage, the board collectively chooses stabilization policies. We compare the relative merits of two collective choice mechanisms - bargaining and majority voting - in avoiding manipulation of the cooperative agreement through the strategic nomination of national representatives.