Doxastic planning and epistemic internalism

• Autores: Karl Schafer
• Localización: Synthese, ISSN-e 1573-0964, Vol. 191, Nº. 12, 2014, págs. 2571-2591
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In the following I discuss the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists from an unfamiliar meta-epistemological perspective. In doing so, I focus on the question of whether rationality is best captured in externalist or internalist terms. Using a conception of epistemic judgments as �doxastic plans,� I characterize one important subspecies of judgments about epistemic rationality�focusing on the distinctive rational/functional role these judgments play in regulating how we form beliefs. Then I show why any judgment that plays this role should be expected to behave the manner internalists predict. In this way, I argue, we can explain why our basic toolbox for epistemic evaluation includes an internalist conception of rationality.