Bill Passage Speed in the US House: A Test of a Vote Buying Model of the Legislative Process

• Autores: Andrew J. Taylor
• Localización: The Journal of legislative studies, ISSN 1357-2334, Vol. 20, Nº. 3, 2014, págs. 285-304
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This article constitutes a test of central tenets of vote buying theories using data on the number of days it takes to pass important bills in the US House. Survival analyses of a model of bill passage length provide confirmatory evidence of vote buying by presidents and the congressional leadership. Bills that attract buyers of votes to maintain the status quo are shown to pass more quickly than those that do not. Bills on the president's agenda and those that are relatively close to members' ideal points also pass quickly. The analyses furnish some interesting insights into possible efforts to make the legislative process quicker.