Arrow's theorem and theory choice

• Autores: Davide Rizza
• Localización: Synthese, ISSN-e 1573-0964, Vol. 191, Nº. 8, 2014, págs. 1847-1856
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In a recent paper (Okasha, Mind 120:83�115, 2011), Samir Okasha uses Arrow�s theorem to raise a challenge for the rationality of theory choice. He argues that, as soon as one accepts the plausibility of the assumptions leading to Arrow�s theorem, one is compelled to conclude that there are no adequate theory choice algorithms. Okasha offers a partial way out of this predicament by diagnosing the source of Arrow�s theorem and using his diagnosis to deploy an approach that circumvents it. In this paper I explain why, although Okasha is right to emphasise that Arrow�s result is the effect of an informational problem, he is not right to locate this problem at the level of the informational input of a theory choice rule. Once the informational problem is correctly located, Arrow�s theorem may be dismissed as a problem