Keeping (Direct) reference in mind

• Autores: Kevan Edwards
• Localización: Noûs, ISSN-e 1468-0068, Vol. 48, Nº. 2, 2014, págs. 342-367
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This paper explores the psychological analogues of a cluster of arguments that have played an important role in motivating a now widespread, reference-based approach in philosophy of language. What I will call the psychological analogues of Kripke-style arguments provide a substantial motivation for a reference-based approach to concepts. Insofar as such an approach is rarely given serious consideration, the availability of these arguments suggests the need for a rethinking of some foundational assumptions in philosophy of mind and other branches of the cognitive sciences.