The priority principle from Kant to Frege

• Autores: Jeremy Heis
• Localización: Noûs, ISSN-e 1468-0068, Vol. 48, Nº. 2, 2014, págs. 268-297
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In a famous passage (A68/B93), Kant writes that �the understanding can make no other use of [�] concepts than that of judging by means of them.� Kant's thought is often called the thesis of the priority of judgments over concepts. We find a similar sounding priority thesis in Frege: �it is one of the most important differences between my mode of interpretation and the Boolean mode [�] that I do not proceed from concepts, but from judgments.� Many interpreters have thought that Frege's priority principle is close to (or at least derivable from) Kant's. I argue that it is not. Nevertheless, there was a gradual historical development that began with Kant's priority thesis and culminated in Frege's new logic.