Delegation in multi-establishment firms: : evidence from I.T. purchasing

• Autores: Kristina McElheran
• Localización: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, ISSN-e 1530-9134, Vol. 23, Nº. 2, 2014, págs. 225-258
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • Recent contributions to a growing theory literature have focused on the tradeoff between adaptation and coordination in determining delegation within firms. Empirical evidence, however, is limited. Using establishment-level data on decision rights over information technology investments, I find that a high net value of adaptation is strongly associated with delegation, as are local information advantages and firm-wide diversification; in contrast, a high net value of within-firm coordination is correlated with centralization. Variation across establishments within firms is widespread: most firms are neither fully centralized nor fully decentralized. Delegation patterns are largely consistent with standard team-theory predictions; however, certain findings, such as a negative correlation between delegation and firm size, call for a consideration of agency costs as well.