Multilateralism, bilateralism, and regime design

• Autores: Alexander Thompson, Daniel Verdier
• Localización: International Studies Quarterly, ISSN-e 1468-2478, Vol. 58, Nº. 1, 2014, págs. 15-28
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Different international regimes are built from legal instruments that vary in terms of whether they are multilateral, bilateral, or a combination thereof. We investigate the reasons for such variation. The choice between multilateralism and bilateralism is a function of the tradeoff between each instrument's relative flaw. Multilateralism is wasteful in incentives, as the same agreement is offered to all states regardless of their compliance costs. Bilateralism mitigates this problem by allowing for more tailored agreements but in the process multiplies transaction costs by requiring many of them. We use a formal model to generate propositions on the design of �lateralism� and the related issue of membership size and offer illustrations in the context of four regimes: foreign direct investment, human rights, climate change, and international trade.