Self-control, willpower and the problem of diminished motivation

• Autores: Thomas D. Connor
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 168, Nº. 3, 2014, págs. 783-796
• Idioma: alemán
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• Resumen

  • Self-control has been described as the ability to master motivation that is contrary to one's better judgement; that is, an ability that prevents such motivation from resulting in behaviour that is contrary to one's overall better judgement (Mele, Irrationality: An essay on Akrasia, self-deception and self-control, p. 54, 1987 ). Recent discussions in philosophy have centred on the question of whether synchronic self-control, in which one exercises self-control whilst one is currently experiencing opposing motivation, is actional or non-actional. The actional theorist maintains that such exercises are actions, whilst the non-actional theorist claims that synchronic self-control consists in the having of unmotivated thoughts which occur at times when agents experience recalcitrant motivations and which serve to attenuate the strength of those motivations. In this paper I discuss a class of cases which has been largely ignored in these discussions, cases which I argue are common synchronic self-control problems, but in which a lack of motivation is the characteristic symptom. I argue that such cases present problems for actional accounts and add some support to the non-actional approach