Luck, propositional perception, and the Entailment Thesis

• Autores: Chris Ranalli
• Localización: Synthese, ISSN-e 1573-0964, Vol. 191, Nº. 6, 2014, págs. 1223-1247
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Looking out the window, I see that it's raining outside. Do I know that it's raining outside? According to proponents of the Entailment Thesis, I do. If I see that p, I know that p. In general, the Entailment Thesis is the thesis that if S perceives that p, S knows that p. But recently, some philosophers (McDowell, in Smith (ed.) Reading McDowell on mind and world, 2002 ; Turri, Theoria 76(3):197-206, 2010 ; Pritchard, Philos Issues (Supplement to Nous) 21:434-455, 2011 ; Pritchard, Epistemological disjunctivism, 2012 ) have argued that the Entailment Thesis is false. On their view, we can see p and not know that p. In this paper, I argue that their arguments are unsuccessful.