Direct phenomenal beliefs, cognitive significance, and the specious present

• Autores: Ted Poston
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 168, Nº. 2, 2014, págs. 483-489
• Idioma: alemán
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• Resumen

  • Chalmers (The character of consciousness, 2010) argues for an acquaintance theory of the justification of direct phenomenal beliefs. A central part of this defense is the claim that direct phenomenal beliefs are cognitively significant. I argue against this. Direct phenomenal beliefs are justified within the specious present, and yet the resources available with the present �now� are so impoverished that it barely constrains the content of a direct phenomenal belief. I argue that Chalmers�s account does not have the resources for explaining how direct phenomenal beliefs support the inference from �this E is R� to �that was R.�