The epistemic turn in deliberative democracy has led to a re-evaluation of the search for truth as the ultimate aim of public deliberation and caused a decline of interest in popular participation and mass democracy. This democratic U-Turn is not confined to theoretical debates, but is also influencing normative reflections on the democratic experimentalism originally promoted by the deliberative turn. The article starts by proposing a re-conceptualisation of recent developments in democratic theory that distinguishes between four main idealtypes of deliberative democracy: Epistemic, Guardian, Integrative and Radical deliberative democracy. Afterwards, the article discusses and critically assesses the justification of the epistemic model of deliberative democracy put forward by David Estlund. First, the meta-ethical arguments employed by Estlund to show the inconsistencies affecting non-epistemic conceptions of deliberative democracy are discussed. Second, the more substantive content of his epistemic reading of deliberative democracy is considered. The conclusion is that epistemic conceptions of deliberative democracy are not only deeply problematic, but also counterproductive. For they tend to undermine the legitimacy of the forms of democratic experimentation promoted so far and dampen the participatory spirit of those involved in it.
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