Respect for the moral law: : the emotional side of reason

• Autores: Janelle DeWitt
• Localización: Philosophy, ISSN-e 1469-817X, Vol. 89, Nº. 1, 2014, págs. 31-62
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Respect, as Kant describes it, has a duality of nature that seems to embody a contradiction � i.e., it is both a moral motive and a feeling, where these are thought to be mutually exclusive. Most solutions involve eliminating one of the two natures, but unfortunately, this also destroys what is unique about respect. So instead, I question the non-cognitive theory of emotion giving rise to the contradiction. In its place, I develop the cognitive theory implicit in Kant's work, one in which emotions take the form of evaluative judgments that determine the will. I then show that, as a purely rational emotion, respect is perfectly suited to be a moral motive.