Minding the Is-Ought Gap

• Autores: Campbell Brown
• Localización: Journal of Philosophical Logic, ISSN-e 1573-0433, Vol. 43, Nº. 1, 2014, págs. 53-69
• Idioma: alemán
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• Resumen

  • The �No Ought From Is� principle (or �NOFI�) states that a valid argument cannot have both an ethical conclusion and non-ethical premises. Arthur Prior proposed several well-known counterexamples, including the following: Tea-drinking is common in England; therefore, either tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders ought to be shot. My aim in this paper is to defend NOFI against Prior�s counterexamples. I propose two novel interpretations of NOFI and prove that both are true.