Environmental Policy Instruments: Technology Adoption Incentives with Imperfect Compliance

• Autores: Carmen Arguedas Tomás, Eva Camacho Cuena, José Luis Zofío Prieto
• Localización: XVII Encuentro de Economía Pública: políticas públicas ante la crisis, 2010, pág. 46
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • We study the incentives to adopt advanced abatement technologies in the presence of imperfect compliance. Interestingly, incentives under emission taxes and pollution abatement subsidies are the same that in the perfect compliance scenario. However, under emission standards imperfect compliance can increase firms� incentives to invest, whereas under an emission permit mechanism investment incentives decrease only if widespread non-compliance induces a (sufficient) reduction in the permit price. Our results are valid for fairly general characteristics of the monitoring and enforcement strategies commonly found in both, theoretical and empirical applications.