Equalization and Costly Conflict (preliminary version)

• Autores: María Cubel
• Localización: XVII Encuentro de Economía Pública: políticas públicas ante la crisis, 2010, pág. 27
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • In this paper we analyze the possibility of going into a situation of con.ict when equalization rules are perceived as unfair by some regions.

    Con.ict is modeled as a game where players seek to maximize their pay- o¤s in a Nash framework. Players are groups of individuals with identical preferences and con.ict is measured as the contribution of each group member into lobbying to try to impose her group preferences to society.

    The onset of con.ict depends on the degree of publicness of the regional budget. When regional budgets are used to provide pure public goods proportional equalization is immune to con.ict. However, none equal- ization rule is immune to con.ict when budgets are private goods. The intermediate option is also explored and o¤ers new insights.