The Role of External Actors in Incentivizing Post-Conflict Power-Sharing

• Autores: Joanne McEvoy
• Localización: Government and opposition: An international journal of comparative politics, ISSN 0017-257X, Nº. 1, 2014, págs. 47-69
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • External actors engaged in peace building often induce domestic elites to share power. This article explores the effectiveness of external incentives in establishing, maintaining or reforming power-sharing. Adopting a rationalist approach to socialization, the research investigates the strategic interaction between external and internal actors in two cases of contemporary power-sharing: Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Herzegovina. External incentives will probably be more effective when they uphold a peace agreement that satisfies groups’ structural preferences on constitutional issues. External incentives can, under certain conditions, lead to internalization and the potential ‘habitualization’ of power-sharing as norm-conforming behaviour. The strategy of external actors will be less effective when their socialization efforts are inconsistent and coercive, viewed as threatening to one or more of the contending groups.