Pierre´s rational and public beliefs

• Autores: Víctor Martín Verdejo Aparicio
• Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 16, Nº. 3, 2012, págs. 451-469
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Paradigmatic cases of disagreement seem not to be compatible with a widespread kind of solution to Kripke�s celebrated Pierre puzzle. As a result, the classical puzzle about rational belief is shown to be also a puzzle about public disagreement/agreement phenomena.

    In this paper, I defend that the new public version of the puzzle is substantial and challenging and conclude that a full solution to Kripke�s considerations must offer a satisfactory account of both the rational and public character of belief attributions. I then argue that a notion of non-belief-individuating understanding is plausibly the key notion that would allow us to arrest both versions of the Pierre puzzle.