Resumen de Peirce sobre analiticidade
In this article, I examine the reconstruction that Peirce does on analytic/synthetic Kantian division, supported by his phenomenology, semiotic and pragmatism. The analysis of Peirce�s writings on mathematic suggests a notion of a posteriori and necessary analytical truths, that is, propositions that express one belief justified in experience, but whose generalization is valid for all the possible worlds. This was a new idea the time that Peirce formulated it, in 19th Century, and it contrasts with semantic-analytical tradition from Frege and was contested by Quine in 1950�s. Peirce�s notion of analyticity is a result of his discovery of the logic of relatives, which led the philosopher to revise the deductive reasoning, dividing it into corollarial and theorematic, which in turn allow us to understand why mathematics is, simultaneously, deductive and non-trivial.
