Manipulating electoral laws in Singapore

• Autores: Netina Tan
• Localización: Electoral Studies: An international Journal, ISSN 0261-3794, Vol. 32, Nº. 4, 2013, págs. 632-643
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The literature on electoral authoritarianism has drawn attention to the use of democratic electoral institutions for undemocratic gains. This paper adds to this body of work by showing how a sophisticated hegemonic party in Singapore manipulated its majoritarian electoral system to “manufacture” its legislative supermajority. By measuring the psychological and mechanical effects of the altered electoral system in Singapore, it shows how changes in the rules of the game boosted the incumbent's legislative dominance despite its declining vote shares in the late 1980s. It also offers new evidence to show how electoral manipulation create an uneven playing field with institutional constraints that penalize smaller parties and benefit the ruling, larger party.