Purposes of reasoning and (a new vindication of) Moore's proof of an external world

• Autores: Manuel Pérez Otero
• Localización: Synthese, ISSN-e 1573-0964, Vol. 190, Nº. 18, 2013, págs. 4181-4200
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • A common view about Moore�s Proof of an External World is that the argument fails because anyone who had doubts about its conclusion could not use the argument to rationally overcome those doubts. I agree that Moore�s Proof is�in that sense�dialectically ineffective at convincing an opponent or a doubter, but I defend that the argument (even when individuated taking into consideration the purpose of Moore�s arguing and, consequently, the preferred addressee of the Proof) does not fail. The key to my defence is to conceive the Proof as addressed to subjects with a different epistemic condition. To sustain this view I formulate some hypothesis about the common general purpose of arguing and I defend that it can be fulfilled even when the addressee of an argument is not someone who disbelieves or doubts its conclusion.