A note on Gibbard's proof

• Autores: Justin Khoo
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Nº. 166 (Supplement), 2013, págs. 153-164
• Idioma: alemán
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• Resumen

  • A proof by Allan Gibbard (Ifs: Conditionals, beliefs, decision, chance, time. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981 ) seems to demonstrate that if indicative conditionals have truth conditions, they cannot be stronger than material implication. Angelika Kratzer's theory that conditionals do not denote two-place operators purports to escape this result [see Kratzer (Chic Linguist Soc 22(2):1-15, 1986 , 2012 )]. In this note, I raise some trouble for Kratzer's proposed method of escape and then show that her semantics avoids this consequence of Gibbard's proof by denying modus ponens. I also show that the same holds for Anthony Gillies' semantics (Philos Rev 118(3):325-349, 2009 ) and argue that this consequence of these theories is not obviously prohibitive--hence, both remain viable theories of indicative conditionals.