Syndicated Leveraged Loans During and After the Crisis and the Role of the Shadow Banking System

• Autores: Christopher L. Culp
• Localización: Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, ISSN-e 1745-6622, Vol. 25, Nº. 2, 2013, págs. 63-85
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In an article published in this journal in 1998, Nobel laureate Merton Miller argued that one of the best weapons available to national economies in their defense against the macroeconomic effects of banking crises is the availability of non-bank financial institutions and products�or what we now refer to as the �shadow banking system.� Although Miller may have exaggerated the independence of bank- and market-based sources of financing, the author argues that events during and after the recent crisis have shown Miller's claims about the importance of non-bank investors in the provision of credit to be fundamentally correct.

    Critics of securitization and the shadow banking system tend to focus on the subprime mortgage story in which the sudden re-pricing of credit risk and the resulting disappearance of investment demand for ABCP, private-label mortgage-related ABS, and ABS CDOs created unexpected and significant downward price pressure on those asset types. But the leveraged loan market tells a very different story. In contrast to the near complete disappearance of private mortgage securitizations, the extraordinary recovery of the U.S. syndicated leveraged loan market demonstrates that the relation between commercial and shadow banking has proved to be a highly productive and resilient one�and very much a two-way street. When leveraged loans and CLOs experienced problems from 2007 through 2009 due primarily to the widespread liquidity and credit market disruptions that affected essentially all structured credit products, institutional investors in leveraged loans disappeared and the leveraged loan primary market imploded. But when institutional participants recognized the value of the underlying asset�corporate loans�and regained confidence in shadow-banking products, leveraged lending by banks recovered quickly and dramatically.

    This outcome is viewed as vindicating Professor Miller's statement about the benefits of shadow markets and securitization� namely, the role of non-bank investors in diversifying the risk of credit creation while at the same time improving the price discovery process in different markets. The recent history of the U.S. leveraged loan market demonstrates that shadow banking system participants play a critical role in meeting the total demand for such loans, and that the ebbs and flows from institutional leveraged loan markets are strongly connected with the health and integrity of the underlying leveraged bank loan market.