I�Doxastic Correctness

• Autores: Pascal Engel
• Localización: Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, ISSN-e 1467-8349, Vol. 87, Nº. 1, 2013, págs. 199-216
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Dialnet Métricas: 3 Citas
• Resumen

  • Normative accounts of the correctness of belief have often been misconstrued. The norm of truth for belief is a constitutive norm which regulates our beliefs through ideals of reason. I try to show that this kind of account can meet some of the main objections which have been raised against normativism about belief: that epistemic reasons enjoy no exclusivity, that the norm of truth does not guide, and that normativism cannot account for suspension of judgement.