II�Mechanistic Explanation: Its Scope and Limits

• Autores: James Woodward
• Localización: Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, ISSN-e 1467-8349, Vol. 87, Nº. 1, 2013, págs. 39-65
• Idioma: inglés
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• Dialnet Métricas: 3 Citas
• Resumen

  • This paper explores the question of whether all or most explanations in biology are, or ideally should be, �mechanistic�. I begin by providing an account of mechanistic explanation, making use of the interventionist ideas about causation I have developed elsewhere. This account emphasizes the way in which mechanistic explanations, at least in the biological sciences, integrate difference-making and spatio-temporal information, and exhibit what I call fine-tunedness of organization. I also emphasize the role played by modularity conditions in mechanistic explanation. I will then argue, in agreement with John Dupré, that, given this account, it is plausible that many biological systems require explanations that are relatively non-mechanical or depart from expectations one associates with the behaviour of machines.