Knowledge Ascriptions By JESSICA BROWN and MIKKEL GERKEN

• Autores: Allan Hazlett
• Localización: Analysis, ISSN-e 1467-8284, Vol. 73, Nº. 4, 2013, págs. 807-809
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Some contemporary theorists of knowledge adopt a meta-linguistic approach, focusing their attention on questions about knowledge attributions (or ascriptions). Brown and Gerken�s volume comprises state-of-the-art contributions to this literature, and will be essential reading for researchers in this area.

    Many have assumed an intimate connection between questions about the nature of knowledge and questions about knowledge attributions (and denials). Several of the present contributors continue in this vein: Jessica Brown (Ch. 2) defends the epistemological relevance of �linguistic considerations and thought-experiment judgements� (32), Ephraim Glick (Ch. 6) equates questions about knowledge-how and questions about attributions of knowledge-how, and Ángel Pinillos (Ch. 9) appeals to �ordinary people�s attributions of knowledge� as evidence that �knowledge is an interest-relative notion� (192). Although Brown is right to note that judgements about thought experiments are not linguistic intuitions, many theorists now think of thought experiments as teaching us not about knowledge but about knowledge attributions � about how we think and talk about knowledge.

    Jennifer Nagel (Ch. 8) discusses an intriguing puzzle arising from the fact that naïve experimental subjects are equally inclined to deny knowledge in Gettier cases and in �skeptical pressure� cases; sophisticated anti-sceptical epistemologists would like to agree with the folk in the first case, but not in the second. Nagel�s solution to this puzzle is instructive when it comes to the question of what empirical psychology (and �