1. Metaphilosophical disagreement According to Joshua Alexander, philosophers use intuitions routinely as a form of evidence to test philosophical theories but experimental philosophy demonstrates that these intuitions are unreliable and unrepresentative.1 According to Herman Cappelen, philosophers never use intuitions as evidence (despite the vacuous sentential leader �intuitively�) and experimental philosophy lacks a rationale for its much-touted existence.2 That two books are diametrically opposed on methodology in philosophy is not noteworthy. But eyebrows might be raised at such contradictory accounts of the phenomenology of philosophical inquiry. What is it that (analytic) philosophers do? Why is it so difficult to achieve consensus on the professional activities in which we engage? The literature on intuitions and experimental philosophy has exploded over the past decade (see, e.g. Knobe and Nichols 2008; Knobe et al. 2012; Nagel 2007). In appraising themes and arguments from these two volumes, my aim will not be a comprehensive review. Instead, progress can be made indirectly by identifying an image of science that generates the underlying notion of �experiment� assumed in experimental philosophy (and by others). This image operates in a presumed analogy between the role of intuitions in testing philosophical theories and the role of empirical evidence in testing scientific theories. The analogy can be reconceptualized by introducing a distinct notion of experimentation from the sciences, exploratory experimentation, which is not focused on theories or hypothesis testing. One result of this reconceptualization is the exposure of an overlooked methodological similarity between the sciences and philosophy: conceptual explication in response to evidence. I argue that further progress in metaphilosophy can be achieved by exploring analogies with different conceptions of scientific inquiry.
2. Experimental philosophy Let us begin with Alexander. The task is to build philosophical theories through a process of testing them with and conforming them to our intuitions.
We ask philosophical �
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