Politics versus Risk in Allocations of Federal Security Grants

• Autores: Holly T. Goerdel
• Localización: Publius: the journal of federalism, ISSN 0048-5950, Vol. 43, Nº. 4, 2013, págs. 600-625
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Distributive political theory is applied to whether politics versus risk determines government spending across four grant programs purposed for homeland security. A model of security funding is tested with data from U.S. states from 2004 to 2006. Findings support politics over risk when programs are designed to award universal benefits to elected officials, such as with fair-sharing policies. However, risk explains funding when programs award narrow, particularistic benefits, such as with urban security initiatives. A key conclusion is that fair-share strategies in grant politics can actually produce unfair allocation outcomes in the area of security. Also, protecting status quo formulas is in the interest of political actors, especially if they might otherwise lose opportunities to secure resources for constituents (state and local governments) in a distressed economy.